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Abstract 
This document is one of three. It describes various security mechanisms and a security policy profile 
for a generic space-based communication architecture. Two other documents accompany this document—
an Operations Concept (OpsCon) and a communication architecture document. The OpsCon should be 
read first followed by the security policy profile described by this document and then the architecture 
document. 
The overall goal is to design a generic space exploration communication network architecture that is 
affordable, deployable, maintainable, securable, evolvable, reliable, and adaptable. The architecture 
should also require limited reconfiguration throughout system development and deployment. System 
deployment includes subsystem development in a factory setting, system integration in a laboratory 
setting, launch preparation, launch, and deployment and operation in space. 
1.0 Goals 
This document was produced as part of an effort to create a generic space exploration communication 
network architecture. The overall goal of this effort is to design a communication network for manned 
or unmanned space exportation that is (1) affordable, (2) deployable, (3) maintainable, (4) securable, 
(5) scalable, (6) evolvable, and (7) reliable (robust). Failure to meet items 3 through 7 will result in a 
system with significant hidden costs that only materialize after initial deployment. 
A secondary goal is to design the network such that it requires limited reconfiguration throughout 
system development and deployment. System deployment includes subsystem development in a factory 
setting, system integration in a laboratory setting, launch preparation, launch, and deployment and 
operation in spacecradle-to-grave (end-of-mission). 
2.0 Introduction 
This document is one of three. Two other documents accompany this document—an Operations 
Concept (OpsCon) (Ref. 1) and a communication architecture document. The OpsCon should be read first 
followed by the security policy profile and then the architecture document. 
The purpose of this particular document is to define what the security policy is and how it affects 
network architecture and design. Various existing and emerging network architectures, technologies, and 
security mechanisms are described. In addition, the following critical items that need to be considered are 
off-nominal operations, the effect that the environment has on the system, and how cryptographic systems 
work is presented. 
Security is based on trust and risk management. Trust is built from the ground up and from the top 
down. Trust is the acceptance that the hardware is doing and what is expected of it, that software is doing 
what is expected of it, and that each entity in the system is doing what is expected of them. With trust 
comes some element of risk. Blind trust is dangerous. Thus, it is imperative that system developers and 
integrators test in a relevant environment to ensure that the system operates as expected (trust but verify). 
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3.0 Terminology 
In order to ensure understanding, a common vocabulary must be established. The following sections 
define a common vocabulary relative to communication networking and data security. 
3.1 Security Activities 
The following are five security activities in an information system (Ref. 2): 
 
Physical security deals with all the physical aspects in a system and its environment. Examples 
include access control to the equipment or physical redundancy. Physical security will not be addressed in 
this document. 
Operational security is concerned with all the functional aspects of the system including 
maintenance, backups, and system configuration control. Operational security will not be addressed in 
this document. 
Logical security includes security mechanisms such as types of cryptography, authentication 
procedures, and deployment of antivirus protection. This document will only address some aspects of 
cryptography and authentication related to protecting information. 
Application security measures are taken throughout the code’s life cycle to prevent gaps in the 
security policy of an application or the underlying system (vulnerabilities) through flaws in the design, 
development, deployment, upgrade, or maintenance of the application (Ref. 3). Application security is 
briefly addressed in this document. 
Telecommunication security is the set of security mechanisms directed and end-to-end security for 
the final user including resource utilization, communications protocols, and operating systems (OSs) and 
equipment. This document will address some areas of resource utilization and communication protocols. 
3.2 Security Mechanisms 
Access Control has a broad scope. Access control is the selective restriction of access to a physical 
place or resource. In this document we are concerned with access to information, networks or utilization 
of resources (e.g., access lists, ip-tables, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs)), and machine-to-
machine access to systems (e.g., radio network access, etc.). 
Authentication is the ability for a sender or a receiver to prove its identity to the entity it is 
communicating with. 
Cryptography is utilized to accomplish this. This document will address authentication. 
Confidentiality preserves authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including 
means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information (Ref. 4). A loss of confidentiality is the 
unauthorized disclosure of information. Confidentiality is extremely important for sensitive data ranging 
from command and control to personal medical data (due to Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) (Ref. 5)). Cryptography is utilized to accomplish this. This document will 
address confidentiality. 
Integrity is guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring 
information nonrepudiation and authenticity. Integrity is extremely important for data such as command-
and-control messages, scientific data, and telemetry used for operational decision making. Cryptography 
is utilized to accomplish this. This document will address integrity. 
Nonrepudiation ensures that communicating parties cannot deny the occurrence of a given event 
(typically the post or the reception of a message). For nonrepudiation with proof of origin, the recipient of 
data is provided with proof of the origin of data protecting against any attempt by the sender to falsely 
deny sending the data or its contents. Cryptography is utilized to accomplish this. 
Availability is ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information. Relative to security, 
availability has more to do with denial of service (DOS). Another area that affects availability is system 
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reliability. Relative to space exploration network architecture, we will assume data availability is a non-
issue by design. Availability will not be addressed in this document. 
4.0 Policy 
Policy is everything. Policy (a.k.a. doctrine) will make or break a network design. Policies are the 
rules of engagement (how one is permitted to operate). Policy is often set by those who have little 
understanding of the full ramifications of their policies. Policy is often given as an overarching set of 
rules and an assumption that one size fits all. Blind policy can be very costly and overbearing and can 
become, in and of itself, a DOS.1 Policy is extremely hard to change because it requires an understanding 
of why the policy is in place and what the ramifications are and places ultimate responsibility on the 
policy setter.2 Security policy often blindly follows International Telegraph Union (ITU) (Ref. 6) or 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (Ref. 7) recommendations without understanding 
the intent of those recommendations, which allow systems to be tailored. Thus, one will end up with the 
same security policy placed on an experimental testbed or a space-based network as those of an entire 
enterprise systemparticularly within the U.S. Government. 
The following are a few examples of policies related to a space-based communication network: 
Space missions are generally government-funded. If you have a deep space mission that can utilize 
the relay satellite of another country, a country that may not have the same political ideals as your 
country, are you willing to utilize that asset and accept the risks that go along with that decision? Or, do 
you deploy your own relay system? In our fiscally restrictive world, do you have the resources to deploy 
your own system? 
If you are using a Store, Carry and Forward (SCF) protocol, this will result in data at rest (DAR) at 
intermediate forwarding nodes. Are you willing to utilize the assets of another country that may not have 
the same political ideals as yours? Are you willing to use another country’s ground stations when you 
have DAR that can be acted upon over a long period of time? Note, data in transit can be captured and 
copied and easily become DAR (Ref. 8). 
There is no right or wrong answer in the two examples provided, but the answers drive the system 
design and the security design—both which should be as one. 
5.0 Givens 
The following are facts and observations that must be considered in order to develop sound security 
policies and architectures. They are presented in no particular order of importance. All must be 
considered. 
 
                                                     
1The following is a prime example of blind policy: In 2015, the U.S. Government implemented a policy that all 
Government laptop computers must have their hard disks encrypted. This is known as Data at Rest (DAR). This policy 
was put in place after a Government laptop with personnel information was lost or stolen. NASA often employs 
college students to work at their facilities for 10-week periods over the summer. It is useful to have the students issued 
laptop computers instead of desktop computers as they move from room to room depending on space availability. A 
request was made for laptops with the Linux operating system. The request was denied as the group in charge did not 
have a Linux laptop build with DAR, even though the current Linux open source build had DAR capability. However, 
the security group would allow the students to have a Linux desktop since the policy did not require desktop computers 
to have DAR enabled. Note, that at no time would the students have any critical information that needed protection 
and the hard disks are wiped clean at the end of the 10-week session. 
2The U.S. military is often more willing to modify policy than other large organizations. To quote a general 
presenting at a meeting on space-based networking, “Doctrine will change to meet the needs of the warfighter.” This 
may appear counter-intuitive at first until one comes to the realization that in the military, the policy makers have 
moved through the ranks and have experienced the ramifications of poor, inflexible doctrine. 
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1. “It is a well-known fact that no other section of the population avail themselves more readily and 
speedily of the latest triumphs of science than the criminal class.” —Inspector John Bonfield, 
Chicago Police 1888. 
2. Too much security is no security as people find a workaround to avoid the security measures (Ref. 9). 
3. “Security is hard. It is a negative deliverable. You don’t know when you have it, only when you have 
lost it!” —Latif Ladid (IPv6 Forum). 
4. “Network Security itself does not provide any type of Return on Investment (ROI). It is about cost 
management. For example: You buy a Picasso straight from the artist and a safe to store it in. The 
safe adds no value to the painting. It only helps prevent loss of the painting (i.e., a cost to you).”  
—Yurie Rich, Command Information. 
5. Architecture plays a major role in securing information systems. The placement of firewalls, proxies, 
and cryptographic elements all affect security and should be considered from day one of the design 
process. 
6. The simpler the network architecture, the better the security because one is more likely able to 
identify security vulnerabilities and thereby protect against those vulnerabilities. Complexity makes 
systems more vulnerable and fragile. 
7. Security breaks everything—or at least it appears to. Security is known as the ultimate DOS! 
8. The application of the various security mechanisms and protocols is highly dependent on the 
environment in which they have to operate. Key factors include the available bandwidth, the end-to-
end delay, and whether or not one has two-way communications. 
9. We need sufficient data capacity in the link3 to ensure security as cryptography adds overhead to data. 
10. Private address space is just that, it is private and uncoordinated. Any attempt to coordinate private 
address space will likely result in failure—particularly when coordination is across disparate 
organizations, for example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and 
European Space Agency (ESA). 
11. “Everybody is talking about the Internet of things as the future of the Internet. Well, all of that is 
based on IPv6. There’s no way we can make IPv4 (IP version 4)...support the Internet of things in the 
future. It won’t work. We need to adopt IPv6. We need to make it happen.” —Jacques Latour, 
Canadian Internet Registration Authority (CIRA). 
12. Securing information at the source provides much more flexibility than securing the information at 
lower layers and requires the least amount of trust. 
13. Conversely, providing security at the physical layer or data link layer provides the least amount of 
flexibility, the greatest cost and requires the greatest amount of trust. 
14. DAR has significantly different challenges than data in transit simply because time is not on your 
side. Note: data in transit can easily be turned into DAR. 
15. Some data is only useful for a limited period of time. In such cases, time is on your side. 
16. Ground-based systems can assume, for all practical purposes, infinite bandwidth or at least sufficient 
bandwidth to get the job done. 
17. Space environments often feature limited bandwidth, extreme delays and highly asymmetric links. 
18. During launch, communication links are extremely low-rate, for example, tens of kbps forward 
(uplink) to hundreds of kilobits per second on the return (downlink). This is due to the difficulty in 
pointing antennas on a vehicle moving at extremely high speeds with a constantly changing 
orientation. Note: launch vehicle data is much more important when things go wrong (e.g., tumbling). 
19. It is possible to lock yourself out of your own system. Assume this will happen and always provide a 
mechanism to recover your system or be willing to accept the consequences (e.g., loss of system). 
                                                     
3Loosely correlates to radiofrequency (RF) bandwidth. However, noisy links, modulation, coding, et cetera, affect 
how much data can be transmitted over a given bandwidth. 
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20. Cognitive networking4 requires situational awareness. One needs to expose many portions of a 
network to enable learning and intelligent decisionmaking. This is often in contrast with security, 
which attempts to hide situational awareness from all but the security mechanisms and operations. 
21. Off-nominal contingency operations need serious consideration with regard to how those operations 
affect the security of the communications network and the physical systems. This is particularly 
difficult for space communications systems where the asset is only reachable via radio links. 
Furthermore, when a space-based system is in trouble, the communication links are often extremely 
low bandwidth and unreliable. 
22. Security by obscurity is not security, particularly if the perceived security in nonexistent.5 
6.0 Hardware 
Machines do not trust, they perform activities and run software. “Trustworthy and secure, means that 
first and foremost, there must be a level of confidence in the feasibility and correctness-in-concept, 
philosophy, and design, regarding the ability of a system to function securely as intended.” (Ref. 11). 
The security principle of modularity services is to isolate functions into well-defined logical units so 
that they can be composed. Layering relates to the application layer, network layer, and security 
kernel/device layer. The modular units are put together at each layer and each layer is added together, 
which provides well-defined functionalities that can provide a valid model of trust (Ref. 12). 
6.1 Virtualization 
Virtualization provides the following functions that improve security via architecture: isolation and 
multitenancy;6 segmentation; and service insertion and chaining. Virtual networks are isolated from other 
virtual networks and from the underlying physical network by default, ensuring users or processes access 
only the information and resources that are necessary for its legitimate purpose. Virtualization provides 
the ability to build policies that leverage service insertion, chaining, and steering to drive service 
execution in the logical services pipeline based on the result of other services. For example, one can map 
security policies to virtual machines (VMs) and seamlessly steer network traffic from designated 
workload VMs to advanced security appliances to enforce the proper policies. 
Virtualization is performed using VMs whereby an entire OS is virtualized inside another physical 
machine and OS. Virtualization is also performed using containers (Ref. 13). Containers are often 
considered as something in the middle between a chroot7 and a full-fledged VM. They create an 
environment as close as possible to a standard Linux installation but without the need for a separate 
kernel. Thus, containers require very little overhead. 
Virtualization combined with software-defined networking (SDN) provides great flexibility in 
network design by allowing network administrators to manage network services through higher-level 
functional abstraction. This is done by separating control plane functions from the data forwarding plane. 
6.2 Complex Electronics (CE) 
The area of trust that must be incorporated into a space architecture is securing the device including 
the physical network element, the platform, and any CE. One must be able to trust that the device will be 
                                                     
4A cognitive network incorporates learning algorithms (Ref. 10). 
5A high-level manager in NASA once stated that use of Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS) 
protocols over Internet Protocol (IP) was more secure because not as many people were familiar with CCSDS 
protocols. Yet, CCSDS protocols are published standards available for anyone to obtain and understand. 
6Multitenancy is an architecture in which a single instance of a software application serves multiple customers. 
7“Chroot” is an operation that changes the apparent root directory for the current running process and their 
children. A program that is run in such an environment cannot access files and commands outside that 
environmental directory tree. 
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available and function as expected. Complex devices must have their own individual security, functions, 
or policies that are independent, yet clear, simple, and sufficient for that device to ensure the device 
performs its intended purpose. 
CEs will perform the bulk of sensor processing and provide the bulk of communications. Their 
functions vary from measuring a temperature to destroying an errant vehicle. Their complexity can vary 
from multicore processors to a simple wireless sensor node. CEs need varying levels of resource 
monitoring with built-in security services, dictated by the device’s resources and trust needed and defined 
by its security policy. 
7.0 Namespaces (Naming and Addressing) 
Why have a section on namespace (naming and addressing) in a security policy document? Much of 
security and securing networks has to do with sound architecture. Proper use of naming and addressing is 
key to development of a simple, elegant architecture. In today’s Internet, because of poor use of naming 
and addressing, it becomes very difficult to properly secure a network. This becomes more and more 
evident as devices become more mobile and the points of attachment to the network vary dynamically. 
Furthermore, many, if not most, of these mobile systems are multihomed systems. That is, information 
can be sent over a variety of links. It is also possible with today’s technology to use those links 
simultaneously. Thus, traditional security methods fail miserably. 
Much of our concepts presented here for naming and addressing come from three sources: “Patterns 
in Network Architectures” (Ref. 14), “A note on Inter-Network Naming, Addressing, and Routing” 
(Ref. 15), and “On the Naming and Binding of Network Destinations” (Ref. 16). In particular, Saltzer 
(Ref. 16) provides a summary of services, nodes, and attachment points that, if strictly followed, enables 
services (a.k.a. applications) to be distributed and/or move, multihoming of nodes, and mobility. 
There are two basic forms for names: locators and identifiers. Locators (a.k.a. addresses) are points of 
attachment. It is highly desirable that addressing is hierarchical in order to aid in routing as agents need 
some clue about where to send information in order to get “closer to the destination” even if they do not 
know the best direct path. Identifiers are not necessarily hierarchical, and may or may not be human 
readable. Identifiers should be unique and are used to identify applications or services. Identifiers are 
bound to locators and discovered via some type of directory service. This binding may change over time, 
particularly for mobile systems or where an application may move. 
In the Internet, there is one namespace, IP addresses, for routing. The World Wide Web contains 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) for higher-level identifiers. The Domain Name System (DNS) 
directory provides a directory service for mapping computers, services, or any resource (e.g., email, 
Unique Resource Locator for Web services, etc.) connected to the Internet. The limitation of one 
namespace, and the global visibility of that namespace to applications, is a root cause of many 
complexities and fragilities within today’s Internet architecture, including the inter-domain routing 
system, the DNS, IP neighbor discovery, and other aspects. This has led to a multitude of security issues 
related to not being able to verify ownership of particular identifiers or addresses and not being able to 
authenticate the bindings between particular identifiers and addresses. These issues have, to some extent, 
been patched over with Boarder Gateway Protocol Security (BGPSEC), Secure Inter-Domain Routing 
(SIDR) (Ref. 17), Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) (Ref. 18), Secure Node Discovery (SeND) 
(Ref. 19), and other extensions, but these have shifted the security issues to issues of increased 
operational and infrastructure complexity. Both Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol 
version 6 (IPv6) namespaces still have centralized (though hierarchical) allocation and management at the 
top by organizations such as Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and various regional Internet registries (RIRs). There are no real 
mechanisms available for creating new namespaces. Even with IPv6, the 128-bit fields have been fixed 
and follow formats with prefixes that IANA defines. 
The traditional approach to networking in today’s Internet is to build one big layer-3 network and 
then deploy firewalls and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) throughout until one deems the network 
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secure. Unfortunately, the configuration becomes so baroque that it will almost certainly break 
eventually—if not already broken. One new approach is to use credentials to build pairwise relations with 
neighbors or end-to-end peers, and to verify hosts and data prior to committing resources. No firewalls, 
VPNs, et cetera, are required in order to implement the policies and security postures desired. Rather, the 
architecture is simply secure by design (Ref. 20). 
8.0 Architecture 
Architecture plays a major role in securing information systems. The placement of firewalls, proxies, 
and cryptographic elements all affect security. Security breaks everything, or at least sometimes it appears 
to. Security mechanisms often do not interact well with other protocols. For example, security 
mechanisms often try to hide situational awareness from everything but security mechanisms. Whereas, 
something like cognitive networking requires situational awareness. 
8.1 Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
Today’s terrestrial Internet based on IP technologies has known flaws. One is the difficulty in 
handling multihome mobile devices, or networks. The current Internet security architecture more often 
than not uses the point of attachment address to identify an entity. Thus, when a device has multiple 
points of attachment and is mobile, the points of attachment are constantly changing. For this case, 
security based on addressing fails miserably. 
Following the Internet Architecture Board’s (IAB’s) Routing and Addressing Workshop in October 
2006 (Ref. 21), the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) formed the Locator/Identifier Separation 
Protocol (LISP) working group to address known issues with the current Internet architecture (see section 
7 of this document, namely, scalable routing and addressing architectures). In general, LISP was to 
address “locator/identifier separation.” The current problems arise because the IP address combines two 
functions, routing locators (point of attachment) and identifiers (who you are) in one number namespace. 
Separating location from identity should allow for efficient aggregation of the routing locator space and 
providing persistent identifiers in the identifier space. The goal of LISP is to develop protocols that 
require no changes to either host protocol stacks or to the “core” of the Internet infrastructure, and offer 
traffic engineering, multihoming, mobility, and other benefits of an identification/location split and can be 
incrementally deployed (Ref. 22). 
One evolving protocol and two future architectures that can utilize, replace, or enhance the current 
Internet are Host Identity Protocol (HIP) (Refs. 23 and 24), Recursive Inter-Networking Architecture 
(RINA) (Ref. 25), and Information-Centric Networking (ICN) (Ref. 26). Each of these has the potential to 
greatly improve and simplify architectures and security, particularly RINA. HIP and RINA are similar in 
that both attempt to solve the problem in TCP/IP architecture as a result of a poorly defined namespace. 
However, HIP attempts to leverage the TCP/IP architecture whereas RINA takes a clean slate approach. 
8.2 Host Identity Protocol (HIP) 
HIP was created, in part, to address the deficiencies of the current Internet as a result of the 
deficiencies in the namespace (i.e., DNS tied to point of attachment). In particular, in the current Internet, 
the transport layers are coupled to the IP addresses. Neither can evolve separately from the other. HIP 
attempts to solve this problem by separating the identity of a host from its location. HIP defines a new 
namespace between the network and transport layers of the TCP/IP architecture. HIP provides upper 
layers with mobility, multihoming, Network Address Translation (NAT) traversal, and security 
functionality. The location of the host is bound to IP addresses and is used for routing packets to the host 
over the current Internet. However, transport and application layers use host identity, which is associated 
to a private-public key pair. A host obtains the identity of a peer from the DNS or a Distributed Hash 
Table (DHT). If DNS or DHT infrastructure is not available, one can use opportunistic HIP for contacting 
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a peer without being able to authenticate the peer. Communications between entities will be protected, but 
both parties are taking a risk as they cannot validate the true identity of the peer, at least not using the 
feature provided within HIP. HIP is currently an experimental protocol within the IETF, but the HIP 
working group is presently chartered to produce standards track versions of the main HIP Request for 
Comments (RFCs) taking as a base the existing experimental RFCs. The working group will also specify 
certificate handling in HIP in a standards track RFC. 
8.3 Recursive Inter-Networking Architecture (RINA) 
“RINA is a new concept that is gaining momentum quickly with a multitude of newly funded 
research (Refs. 25, 27, and 28). RINA is a clean-slate Internet architecture that builds on a very basic 
premise, yet fresh perspective that networking is not a layered set of different functions but rather a single 
layer of distributed Interprocess Communication (IPC) that repeats over different scopes—i.e., same 
functions/mechanisms but policies are tuned to operate over different ranges of the performance space 
(e.g., capacity, delay, and loss)—Figure 1. Furthermore, how a Distributed IPC Facility (DIF) is 
managed, including addressing is hidden from the applications (Ref. 29) thereby enabling applications to 
be developed within a more secure architecture.” —The Recursive InterNetwork Architecture (Ref. 30). 
Some important features of RINA are 
 
 Enabling of multihoming and mobility 
 Reduction in overhead by reducing addressing 
 Increased routing performance and reduce routing tables 
 Enabling of scoped Quality-of-Service (QoS) 
 Simplified security 
 Enabling of shared infrastructure 
 
 
 
Figure 1.—Example of the Recursive Inter-Networking Architecture (RINA) architecture (Ref. 30). DIFs is 
Distributed Interprocess Communication (IPC) Facilities.  
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8.4 Information-Centric Networking (ICN) 
“Information-Centric Networking (ICN) marks a fundamental shift in communications and 
networking. In contrast with the omnipresent and very successful host-centric paradigm, which is based 
on perpetual connectivity and the end-to-end principle, ICN changes the focal point of the network 
architecture from the end host to ‘named information’ (or content, or data). In this paradigm, connectivity 
may well be intermittent. End-host and in-network storage can be capitalized upon transparently, as bits 
in the network and on storage devices have exactly the same value. Mobility and multi-access are the 
norm, and anycast, multicast, and broadcast are natively supported.” —RFC 7476 (Ref. 31). 
Companies such as Google, Facebook, and Netflix are interested in ICN as these groups specialize in 
content delivery. 
9.0 Environment 
The application of the various security mechanisms and protocols is highly dependent on the 
environment in which they must operate. Key factors include the available bandwidth, the end-to-end 
delay, and whether or not one has two-way communications. 
The available bandwidth may dictate what type of security protocols one wishes to use, particularly 
with regard to key negotiation such as Internet Key Exchange (IKE) or Internet Key Exchange Version 2 
(IKEv2). Limited bandwidth may also render use of large keys or certain algorithms difficult, impractical 
or impossible. 
Large end-to-end delays may break certain security measures. The basic problem is that many 
security schemes require some type of time-sensitive challenge/response technique. Often, time 
sensitivity is added to circumvent man-in-the-middle and replay attacks. In many cases implementations 
allow some adjustment of the time sensitivity. However when one gets into the realm of a few seconds of 
round trip times (RTTs), one may have reached the limitations of some protocol implementations. 
Protocols that have time-sensitive security mechanisms include IKE, IKEv2, and mobile-IP. 
Most, if not all, key negotiation and time-sensitive security mechanisms require two-way 
communication in order for the receiving system to send a challenge to the communication initiator and 
for that communication initiator to send a response. Note, this does not necessarily mean that a specific 
link has to be bidirectional or symmetric, only that two-way communication must be possible end to end. 
Thus, if secure communication must be performed over a unidirectional link with no response, only those 
protocols that can operate in such an environment can be used. IP Security (IPsec) is one such protocol. 
However, pre-placed keys or cached keys and preconfigured security associations are necessary as 
negotiation of keys, algorithms, and security associations are not possible (see IPsec Section). In theory, 
Delay/Disruption/Disconnection Tolerant Networking (DTN) and its associated security mechanisms are 
supposed to work in this environment. However, there is currently no approved IETF standard for DTN or 
DTN security and no approved key management mechanism. 
10.0 Off-Nominal Operations 
Off-nominal contingency operations need serious consideration. Depending on the security 
mechanisms put in place, security is likely to be compromised in the name of recovery. The following are 
a few questions that must be considered: 
 How does one perform hardware reset of a system (e.g., satellite and rover)? In many space-based 
systems, hardware reset signals can be set by ground command via a critical command decoder. The 
need to protect how such a reset is accomplished is critical. 
○ This is particularly interesting for a system that is only reachable via SCF techniques (e.g., a 
rover on the dark side of the Moon) (Ref. 32). Sending such a command through a SCF network 
that may consist of multiple hops is nontrivial, particularly if one does not own and operate the 
entire network infrastructure. 
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 What happens if a system loses time synchronization and the system relies on a protocol that requires 
time synchronization such as DTN (Refs. 33 and 34)? 
11.0 Cryptography and Key/Certificate Management 
The main purpose of encryption is to hide information from anyone or anything that does not have a 
proper key. The intent is to make it so difficult to obtain the information that the effort becomes 
overbearing. 
“One of the big revelations to come out of the National Security Agency (NSA) documents leaked in 
2013 by Edward Snowden didn’t have to do with what the NSA was doing with our data. Instead, it had 
to do with what the NSA couldn’t do: Namely, the agency couldn’t break cryptography. ...The weakness 
in encryption isn’t the algorithms and it isn’t data in transit; it’s everything else (e.g. bad 
implementations, the weak keys, any kind of back doors being inserted in the software, and how 
encryption keys are stored).” (Ref. 35). Henceforth referred to as the “Snowden Revelation.” 
Note, recently it was estimated that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) paid over $1.3 million 
to have someone obtain access to an iPhone used by terrorists. Yet, it is unclear whether the technique 
used actually broke the encryption or simply found a way to get past the locking mechanism. Reports 
seem to indicate that the later may be true, which further backs the Snowden Revelation. “First, it was the 
FBI to break into an encrypted iPhone without Apple’s help. Around the same time, the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD) was breaking into an iPhone on its own. In either case, the mysterious hacks 
used by law enforcement did not actually break Apple’s encryption algorithms, but they allowed 
investigators to access data on devices that were locked.” (Ref. 36). 
The following section provides an overview of cryptographic techniques used in communication 
networking including symmetric and asymmetric cryptography and key management. 
Symmetric encryption uses the identical key to both encrypt and decrypt data (a.k.a. shared key). A 
major advantage of using symmetric encryption is symmetric key algorithms trend to be computationally 
much faster than asymmetric algorithms. A disadvantage is that symmetric keys are not scalable. One 
needs to maintain a separate symmetric key for each entity one wishes to communicate with in order to 
maintain separate and confidential communication channels. In addition, it is difficult to know if a 
symmetric key has been compromised. The longer one uses a key, the more information an attacker has to 
compromise the key. Thus, it is highly desirable to change symmetric keys periodically such as after a 
certain amount of time has passed or a certain amount of data has been encrypted. The ability to change 
the symmetric key periodically in a controlled manner is part of key management. If one changes the key 
for each time two identical entities communicate, that is known as a session key. 
Asymmetric encryption uses two related keys (public and private) for data encryption and decryption. 
The private key is never exposed. A message that is encrypted by using the public key can only be 
decrypted by applying the same algorithm and using the matching private key. The main advantage of 
asymmetric cryptography is that it scales. One only needs to know the public key of each entity one 
wishes to have secure communications with. The disadvantage of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms is 
that they are much more computationally intensive and thus slower than symmetric cryptography. 
Asymmetric cryptography is often applied to solve the secure key distribution problem. One can 
encrypt a session key using the public key of the entity one wishes to communicate with. Only the entity 
with the private key can then decrypt the encrypted session key. In this manner, asymmetric cryptography 
is used to establish a symmetric session key. Thus one gets the best of both asymmetric and symmetric 
cryptography: scalability and speed. 
Asymmetric keys are often allocated as part of a security certificate (a.k.a. public key certificate, 
digital certificate, or identity certificate). A security certificate proves ownership of a public key. Security 
certificates are the basis for identity-based security and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The PKI for the 
Internet is described in a series of X.509 RFCs as well as International Telegraph Union— 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU‒T) documents. For example, RFC 5280 (Ref. 37) 
profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) for use in the Internet. 
NASA/TM2016-219123 11 
 
Key revocation is an essential part of key management. When a key has been compromised or is no 
longer valid that key must be removed from the system. Such removal procedures are known as key 
revocation. How one determines a key is compromised is out of scope for this document. One common 
way a key may become invalid is if an individual or entity is no longer part of the security enclave such as 
when someone leaves the company. When this happens, there needs to be a mechanism in place to inform 
all others in that enclave that a particular key is no longer valid even if the date on the associated 
certificate indicates otherwise. 
Key management is an extremely complex and difficult problem in any environment. Within the 
Internet, protocols have been established for key management. However, the assumption is that systems 
are fully connected—at least most of the time—and that there is sufficient data capacity in the links to 
enable real-time communications with key servers, certificate authorities, and revocation list servers. In 
aeronautics and space, this is often not the case with the exception of the ground-based portion of the 
network. Communication links often have very low data capacity or low-data-rate links. Systems are 
often disconnected and, for space-based networks, this may be for very long periods of time. Furthermore, 
the transmission propagation delays for deep space communications may make negotiation of session 
keys impractical. Thus, although many of the cryptographic algorithms and techniques used in the 
Internet can be applied to aeronautics and space-based communications, many of the protocols and 
procedures cannot. Key management and distribution in aeronautics and space is an area that requires 
much research and development. 
12.0 Security Layers/Mechanisms 
12.1 Physical 
The physical layer in communications networks pertains to the wired, fiberoptic, or wireless channels. 
These channels are susceptible to eavesdropping. With regard to wireless systems, jamming is also 
possible. Numerous techniques can be deployed to help protect these channels. Bulk encryption is one 
mechanism. For wireless systems, some often used security mechanisms including spread spectrum 
techniques, frequency hopping, and information theoretic security.8 Combining all of these techniques 
results in a multidimensional, multifaceted, cross-layer security solution. Except for many-to-many radio 
systems, physical link security does not scale. It only secures point-to-point traffic. In addition, if one 
wishes to send the bulk encrypted data to some decryption unit that is not at the other end of the radio, 
one needs specialized hardware to wrap the data into routable packets that can be transported over the 
Internet (Figure 2). This is an extremely expensive proposition because it requires specialized hardware at 
each ingress and egress point. This generally means one must own the ingress and egress points inhibiting 
the use of shared infrastructure. 
One attractive characteristic of bulk encryption is that it is relatively easy to manage because there is 
nothing like Security Associations (SAs) or Security Policy Databases (SPDs), Security Association 
Databases (SADs), and Peer Association Databases (PADs) as in IPsec (Ref. 38). Bulk encryption is 
relatively foolproof because everything is encrypted. However, scalable deployment of security keys is 
extremely complex—particularly for over-the-air keying (Ref. 39). 
 
                                                     
8Information theoretic security combines signal processing, communications, and coding technique to exploit 
radiofrequency channel characteristics such as multipath. 
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Figure 2.—Bulk Encryption Architecture. 
12.2 Data Link 
The data link can be over a wired or fiberoptic or wireless system. For wired systems, the traditional 
assumption has been that the system is trusted. There are exploits that occur in wired data links (Ref. 40), 
but for a closed space-based network, the assumption of a trusted wired network is reasonable. For 
wireless communications, security is usually performed in the data link layer. The security usually takes 
two forms, access control and encryption of the data channel. This is the case for commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) systems such as Wi-Fi (802.11 family) and WiMax (802.16 family). Access control may be 
performed using passwords, shared secrets, preconfigured Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
addresses or certificates. 
CCSDS is currently, as of May 2015, developing a Space Data Link Security Protocol (SDLSP) 
(Ref. 41). This protocol will support the three Space Data Link Protocols: Telemetry (TM), Telecommand 
(TC), and Advanced Orbiting Systems (AOS). The SDLSP provides authentication, encryption, and 
authenticated encryption for the data in the Transfer Frame Data Field of a TM, TC, or AOS Transfer 
Frame. Note, the SDLSP does not address key management. It is also extremely bandwidth inefficient for 
securing IP traffic. Finally, as a data link protocol, it does not scale. It only secures traffic point to point.9 
12.3 Network 
Network-layer security is implemented by protecting the information payload to ensure confidentiality, 
authentication, and/or integrity. In many instances the original header is also obscured via a tunneling 
mechanism. In addition, mechanisms should exist that provide access controls at the egress and ingress of 
a system. 
                                                     
9In a properly architected communication network, lower-layer protocols should never (or very rarely) be tunneled 
over an upper-layer protocol. 
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In the Internet, network layer security is centered around IP addressing. One can use IPsec protocols 
to secure packets to ensure authentication, confidentiality, or both. IPsec-related protocols form the basis 
for IPsec. There are numerous (50 plus and growing) RFCs related to IPsec. RFC 4301 (Ref. 38) 
describes the security architecture for IP, which is designed to provide security services for traffic at the 
IP layer.10 Other base IPsec RFCs describe encryption, cryptographic algorithms, and uses. 
Network layer security can allow for great flexibility, but at the expense of complexity. IPsec is a 
prime example. One can control security at a network level down to a single source host to single 
destination host per protocol. Expect security in other network types (e.g., DTN and ICN) to implement 
similar granularity. 
At the network layer, one may control access based on source or destination address or both using 
access lists such as those found in commercial routers or, in the case of Linux-based systems, iptables 
(Ref. 42). The iptables is a software mechanism to set up, maintain, and inspect the tables of IP packet 
filter rules in the Linux kernel. Network layer security scales quite well in fixed networks. 
One of the major flaws in today’s Internet is that network security is closely associated with the point 
of attachment, the address. Thus, if an entity is mobile and multihomed (multiple points of attachment), 
security becomes difficult as the points of attachment keep changing. Thus, all of the SADs, SPDs, and 
PADs must be updated accordingly. IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE) (Ref. 43) is 
one protocol that attempts to address some of these issues. 
12.4 Transport 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery 
for communication between hosts. TLS (Ref. 44) is the primary protocol used in the Internet today for 
communications security although Secure Socket Layer (SSL) (Ref. 45) may still be in use. SSL was 
developed by Netscape Corporation and for all practical matters has been replaced by TLS. The primary 
goal of TLS is to provide privacy and data integrity between two communicating applications. TLS is 
layered on top of some reliable transport protocol, generally Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), and 
provides security services to upper layer protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) (Ref. 46). 
Use of TLS with HTTP (Ref. 47) is known as Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS). 
12.5 Application 
One definition of Application security is a set of mechanisms to ensure the application is well written 
such that there are no vulnerabilities through flaws in the design, development, and maintenance of the 
application code. Another definition is methods of protecting applications from malicious attacks that may 
expose private information. 
Some common applications are surfing the Web, remote login, file transfer, network management, 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), streaming media, Internet Relay Chat (IRC), and email. In reality none 
of these is secure per either definition above. 
Various transport-layer security mechanisms are often used to limit access to an application. However, 
that does not mean the application is secure. Examples include 
 
 Web applications use HTTP as the underlying protocol. HTTP can be secured to some degree with 
TLS. 
 Secure remote login is generally performed using Secure Shell (SSH). SSH (Ref. 48) allows a user to 
establish a secure channel over an insecure network in a client-server architecture in a secure way. 
The SSH client has a local database that associates each host name (as typed by the user) with the 
                                                     
10If one wishes to understand what is required for any network security architecture, not just Internet Protocol, this 
is a good starting point. 
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corresponding public host key. Another method is to have the host name-to-key association is 
certified by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). 
 File transfers use File Transfer Protocol (FTP) which is unsecure. However file transfers can be secured 
using File Transfer Protocol Secure (FTPS), SSH File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) or Secure Copy (SCP). 
File Transfer Protocol Secure (FTPS) is provided by employing TLS protocol for channel encryption. 
SCP uses SSH 1.x which has been deprecated while SFTP uses SSH 2.x and is meant to replace SCP. 
For authentication FTPS uses X.509 certificates, while SFTP uses SSH keys. 
 
Email and IRC (messaging) are protocols that were not designed with privacy or security in mind. 
The information can be secured using cryptographic techniques to either encrypt information and/or 
authenticate the sender of information to ensure information integrity. However, the information 
transmitted in the application is often the method used to gain initial access and exploit systems (e.g., 
viruses, malicious code, and phishing). Just because the information was encrypted does not mean that 
information is harmless. 
Network management, in general, is a set of tools and protocols that allows one to control and 
configure network assets such as bridges, routers, servers, and workstations remotely as well as receive 
reports and triggers from those assets indicating the status and potential problems with systems. Simple 
Network Management Protocol (SNMP) is one of the main protocols used to perform these functions. 
SNMP has been refined over the years to include many security features to ensure only those SNMP 
controllers with proper credentials can manage assets. SNMPv3 includes three services: authentication, 
privacy, and access control. SNMPv3 introduced the concept of a principal, which is the entity on whose 
services are provided or processing takes place. The identity of the principal and the target agent together 
determine the security features that will be invoked, including authentication, privacy, and access control. 
The use of principals allows security policies to be tailored to the specific principal, agent, and 
information exchange and gives human security managers considerable flexibility in assigning network 
authorization to users (Ref. 49). SNMP is designed to operate in a fully connected network with relatively 
high bandwidth expectations. For space-based systems the basic ideas behind general network 
management applications would apply, but new techniques would need to be developed (Ref. 50). 
12.5.1 Overlay Networks 
A network overlay is simply one network residing on top of another. For example, Delay/ 
Disruption/Disconnection Tolerant Networking (DTN) is often consider an overlay network as it 
communicates over other heterogeneous networks via convergence layers (Figure 3). Thus DTN may 
operate over an IP network or Bluetooth (Bluetooth Special Interest Group) network. Likewise, it is 
possible to run an IP network over a DTN network such as was done in the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) Wireless Network after Next (WNaN) radios (Ref. 51). 
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Figure 3.—Delay/Disruption/Disconnection Tolerant 
Networking (DTN) Bundle Protocol Architecture—RFC 
5050 (Ref. 33). 
 
ICN (Ref. 52) can also be considered a network overlay in some instances. ICN is an approach to 
evolve the Internet. Distributing and manipulating named information (e.g., pictures, videos, and cloud 
computing) is a major application in the Internet today. ICN enables data to become independent from 
location, application, storage, and means of transportation. Techniques such as in-network caching and 
replication are expected to greatly improve efficiency, better scalability with respect to information/ 
bandwidth demand, and better robustness in challenging communication scenarios. Publish/Subscribe 
techniques are expected to dominate this network architecture. ICN has the potential to solve problems 
with mobility, multihoming, and simplifying security as emphasis is placed on protecting the data rather 
than the network. 
13.0 Security Policy Profile 
NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 2810.1, NASA Information Security Policy, and NASA Procedural 
Requirement (NPR) 2810.1, Security of Information Technology, provides more details on IT security 
requirements at NASA. However, these documents are directed at fixed terrestrial systems and must only 
be used as guiding principals rather than rigid documents. Policy must be tailored for the operational 
environment. Furthermore, these documents are somewhat dated in that they have no mention of ICN, 
DTN, RINA, or any other new networking concepts. The Internet and networking in general are 
changing. Systems are becoming mobile and multihomed (i.e., multiple connections off the system often 
to different links or even different service providers. New technologies such as SDN, ICN, and Multipath 
TCP (MP–TCP) are constantly being created. Much of these break traditional network security 
methodologies. 
Proper security policy involves the development and application of sound risk managementyes, a 
sound security policy involves risk (Ref. 53). Self DOS is not sound security policy. Cover your butt 
(CYB)11 is not a sound security policy. Security by obscurity is not a sound security policy. Sound 
security policy is only possible when one has a complete understanding of the network or networks 
involved in the overall communication architecture. 
This security policy developed in the following subsections assumes a cooperating and collaborating 
multination network. 
                                                     
11Cover your butt (CYB) is an activity, usually in a work-related or bureaucratic context, done by an individual to 
protect himself or herself from possible subsequent criticism.  CYB denotes a type of institutional risk-averse 
mentality that works against accountability and responsibility, which is harmful to the institution’s overall 
effectiveness. 
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The system should work over shared infrastructure. 
 
 One SHOULD NOT assume that we control all infrastructures. 
 One SHOULD NOT assume that all entities providing infrastructure or communication services can 
be trusted.  
 
The security policy MUST be at a level sufficient to (1) match the type of data is moving through the 
systems, (2) understand the degree that data (information) needs to be protected, and (3) identify where in 
the communication protocol stack that protection needs to occur (e.g., at the application, within the 
network, at the physical link or multiple places). 
13.1 Recommended Policy 
Complex Electronics (CE): CE need to be architected and designed for security policies. Software 
and hardware design must monitor operations and enforce assurance/security policies. The design should 
be kept as simple and small as possible. Access must be denied in the reset/default state. The protection 
scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted. The security monitor failure state must be 
secure and within the defined normal operations of the system (fail safe). 
Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS): Most commercial applications and Internet standard protocols 
will work perfectly spot fine in a space environment. For some communication links, the propagation 
delays can be quite long such as Earth to Mars or Earth to anything deep space beyond Mars. In this 
instance, a limited number of IP will work well. Another item that must be considered, which is not 
unique to space, is that systems are often disconnected from the network and do not have a clear, clean, 
large bandwidth connected path between source and destination. Anything on the ground or related to the 
ground infrastructure can most certainly use standard IPs and applications. Anything within a vehicle or 
near to the vehicle can most certainly use standard Internet Protocols (IPs) and applications to 
communicate within that domain. Thus we need sound security policies to enable use of COTS 
applications and Internet standard protocols while maintaining a secure network. 
Studies have shown that “Open source (open source code) does not pose any significant barriers to 
security, but rather reinforces sound security practices by involving many people that expose bugs quickly, 
and offers side-effects that provide customers and the community with concrete examples of reusable, 
secure, and working code.” (Ref. 54). It is reasonable for one to expect similar with hardware and firmware 
(i.e., PLDs) as the greater the use and the variety of applications, the more likely vulnerabilities will be 
uncovered. 
Encryption: Use encryption judiciously only where necessary. There is an expense for encryption 
and multiple layers of encryption add to the expense and complexity of the system. Encrypt all data that 
needs to be private or confidential at the source. If data is already encrypted at the source, bulk link-layer 
encryption does little to improve security, Bulk link-layer encryption does obscure what is happening on 
that direct data link, but for a very high price. Similar can be said for network-layer encryption. However, 
network-layer encryption does provide a mechanism for segregating networks while transversing the open 
Internet (i.e., red/black separation (Ref. 55)). 
Data at rest (DAR): All data should be considered DAR simply because, for any large network that 
passes data over another’s network, one cannot truly ensure that data has not been copied and stored 
elsewhere. 
Network segregation: Restrict access to only the networks of interest (i.e., segregate networks). This 
will simplify the security architecture and allow one to deploy proper security policies per network type. 
Command and control: The following is required for all critical command and control networks 
such as those operating vehicle engines. 
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 Command-and-control networks MUST be segregated from general user network. 
 Authenticate all command and control messages. Note encryption is a form of authentication. 
Authentication is not a form of encryption. 
 
IPv4 vs. IPv6: All Internet Protocol (IP) systems should utilize IPv6 for a number of reasons: 
 
 IPv4 is coming to end of life. 
 There is a push for all new IPs to be IPv6 only (Ref. 56). 
 IPv6 networks, if designed properly, should be greatly simplified as there should be no need for 
middle boxes such as NATs. 
 IPv6 has scoped addressing (Ref. 57). 
 
Shared infrastructure: Use of shared infrastructure is permitted. However, shared infrastructure 
should be treated as a “Black Network.”12 Data that needs to be protected should be encrypted to an 
appropriate level. Such encryption SHOULD be at the network layer or above, and SHOULD NOT be at 
the data link layer. 
Use of shared infrastructure should be encouraged in order to reduce costs and increase flexibility and 
reliability. 
Identity-based security: To remain architecturally sound and improve security, identity-based 
security (use of identifiers, secure namespaces, and certificates to validate identifiers) should be 
implemented (Ref. 20). 
Auditing: One cannot place the same auditing requirements and implementations on space-based 
assets as would be done on ground-based assets. 
Sign in: One cannot place the same sign in (a.k.a. log in) requirements and implementations on 
space-based assets as would be done on ground-based assets. For example, in manned space flight, you 
know the crew and hopefully trust them. Thus, local sign in may not be required. Safety over security.13 
14.0 Summary 
This document describes the various security mechanisms and a security policy profile for a generic 
space-based communication architecture. The overall goal is to design a generic space exploration 
communication network architecture that is affordable, deployable, maintainable, securable, evolvable, 
reliable, and adaptable. 
Policies are the rules of engagement (how one is permitted to operate). Policy will make or break 
your network design. Policy should not be treated as one size fits all. Blind policy can be very costly and 
overbearing. Policy must be tailored for the operational environment. Documents such as NASA Policy 
Directive (NPD) 2810.1, NASA Information Security Policy, and NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 
2810.1, Security of Information Technology, are directed at fixed terrestrial systems and must only be 
used as guiding principals rather than rigid documents when considering space and aeronautical 
environments. 
                                                     
12Encrypted and unencrypted networks are referred to as “red” and “black.” The red network indicates the network 
is secure and the data is not encrypted (commonly referred to as the “plaintext” interface), and the black network is 
the side of the network that carries the post-encrypted data (commonly referred to as the “cipher-text” interface) 
(Ref. 55). 
13The military High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) do not use keys. They have an on/off 
switch by the steering wheel, which makes it easier for the crew to get out of hot zones than if they have to find 
keys. 
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Appendix A.—Acronym List 
AOS Advanced Orbiting Systems 
BGPSEC Boarder Gateway Protocol Security 
CA Certificate Authority 
CCSDS Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems 
CE Complex Electronics 
COTS Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
CRL Certificate Revocation List 
CYB Cover Your Butt 
DAR Data at Rest 
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DHT Distributed Hash Table 
DIF Distributed IPC Facility 
DNS Domain Name System 
DNSSEC DNS Security 
DOS Denial of Service 
DTN Delay/Disruption/Disconnection Tolerant Networking 
ESA European Space Agency 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FTP File Transfer Protocol 
FTPS File Transfer Protocol Secure 
HIP Host Identity Protocol 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure 
IAB Internet Architecture Board 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICN Information-Centric Networking 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IKE Internet Key Exchange 
IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange Version 2 
IP Internet Protocol 
IPC Interprocess Communication 
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IPsec IP Security 
IPv4 Internet Protocol Version 4 
IPv6 Internet Protocol Version 6  
IRC Internet Relay Chat 
ITU International Telegraph Union 
ITU‒T International Telegraph Union—Telecommunication Standardization Sector 
LAPD Los Angeles Police Department 
LISP Locator/Identifier Separation Protocol 
MAC Message Authentication Code 
MOBIKE IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol 
MP–TCP Multipath TCP 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAT Network Address Translation 
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NPD NASA Policy Directive 
NPR NASA Procedural Requirement 
NSA National Security Agency 
OS Operating System 
OpsCon Operations Concept 
PAD Peer Association Database 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
QoS Quality-of-Service  
RINA Recursive Inter-Networking Architecture 
RIR Regional Internet Registry 
RFC Request for Comment 
ROI Return on Investment 
RTT Round Trip Time 
SA Security Association 
SAD Security Association Database 
SCF Store, Carry and Forward 
SCP Secure Copy 
SDLSP Space Data Link Security Protocol 
SDN Software-Defined Networking 
SeND Secure Node Discovery 
SFTP SSH File Transfer Protocol 
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SIDR Secure Inter-Domain Routing 
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol 
SPD Security Policy Database 
SSH Secure Shell 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
TC Telecommand 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol 
TCP/IP Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
TM Telemetry 
URL Uniform Resource Locator 
VLAN Virtual Local Area Network 
VM Virtual Machine 
VoIP Voice Over Internet Protocol 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
WNaN Wireless Network after Next 


